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Abstract
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along the river, children of southwestern Pennsylvania in the 1960s tended to develop one of two
attitudes toward regulation in general.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Growing up seeing flames leaping and smoke billowing out of the
smokestacks of steel mills along the river, children of southwestern
Pennsylvania in the 1960s tended to develop one of two attitudes toward
regulation in general. As the 1960s faded into the 1970s, it was regulation
that rid the neighborhood of the rotten-egg stench of sulfurous fumes. It was
regulation that cleared the air so that air quality index warnings receded into
the past, enabling all citizens, including the elderly and young children, to go
outside every day. Along with the clearer skies and non-toxic air, however,
came the decline of the American steel industry. Certainly regulation was
not the sole cause of that decline, and one also can attribute the decrease in
pollution to the decline, but industry blamed increased environmental
regulation in part for high production costs that led to foreign steel
dominance. By 1983, unemployment had hit 13.9% in Allegheny County,
home of Pittsburgh, the industrial center of the area.1 Mills continued to
close up and down the Monongahela River Valley over the next few years,2
and it was easy for millworkers and their families to focus on the negatives
of regulation, holding it responsible for at least part of their economic strife.
The tall, steep hill across the Monongahela River from the Clairton
Works steel mill, however, demonstrates the benefits of regulation. During
the 1960s and 1970s, no plant would grow on that hillside. Poisonous haze
and particulates prevented any greenery from sprouting. Lacking vegetation
anchoring the scant dirt covering its rocks, that hillside gave way
periodically, and drivers had to detour around rockslide after rockslide
closing the road below. Beginning with the onset of environmental
regulation and continuing today, thanks to regulation, the hillside is covered
in greenery holding the soil firmly in place. There are no more rockslides.
The regulation some blamed at least in part for their misfortune was that
1.
Bill Toland, In desperate 1983, there was nowhere for Pittsburgh’s
economy to go but up, PGH. POST-GAZETTE (Dec. 23, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.postgazette.com/business/businessnews/2012/12/23/In-desperate-1983-there-was-nowhere-forPittsburgh-s-economy-to-go-but-up/stories/201212230258.
2.
Id.
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hillside’s savior. Those enjoying clear skies and breathing cleaner air also
were thankful for that greenery, the sight of which still pre-disposes some to
look favorably upon regulation of business in general.
II.

REGULATION OF THE FREE MARKET GUIDED BY ETHICS

This symposium issue of the Nova Law Review addresses regulation
of the healthcare industry, not the environment; but that hillside outside of
Clairton, Pennsylvania, symbolizes the recurring “regulation versus free
market” debate in this country. Steel and associated heavy industries
dominated southwestern Pennsylvania beginning in the late 1870s; by the
1940s, operating virtually free of environmental regulation, they had filled
the sky with smoky haze, rendering Pittsburgh as dark as midnight in late
morning.3 Skies began to clear after smoke control began in that city in
1946, but battles continued over regulatory expansion throughout the region.4
The memory of that hillside as it existed in the 1960s illustrates the effect of
the free market, only recently regulated, on that particular patch of Earth. In
contrast, its condition today, after increasing state and federal regulation,
illustrates the benefits of regulation. Such an illustration can shape overall
attitudes toward regulation regardless of the subject being regulated.
Titled Regulating Innovation in Healthcare: Protecting the Public
or Stifling Progress?, the articles to follow comment on various aspects of
the politically sensitive topic of healthcare regulation. Politicians and
policymakers generally range from those favoring intense regulation, such as
that with which “Americans had a love affair” from the 1880s to the late
1970s, to those advocating the “Age of Deregulation,” marked by some as
beginning around 1978.5 The range of opinions is just as broad in healthcare,
as the 2016 presidential campaign and the debates characterizing the
beginning of the Trump Administration illustrate.6

3.
See STEFAN LORANT, PITTSBURGH: THE STORY OF AN AMERICAN CITY 376
(2d ed. 1975) (illustrating downtown Pittsburgh with all lights on at 11 a.m. in 1945). Lorant
describes Pittsburgh as “the hearth of the nation” beginning in the late 1800s. Id. at 177, 324
(picturing a “bleak scene” at 3:00 PM).
4.
See id. at 381, 390 (noting that, despite the passage of a city ordinance in
1941, World War II postponed its operation until 1946 and explaining that state legislation to
expand smoke control beyond the city first was introduced in 1947).
5.
See Stephen G. Wood et al., Regulations Deregulation and ReRegulation: An American Perspective, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 381, 381–384 (1987).
6.
See Andrew Gavil, Trump’s Simplistic Attack on Regulation is Misguided
and
Self-Defeating
FORBES
(Mar.
8,
2017
9:41
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/washingtonbytes/2017/03/08/trumps-simplistic-attack-onregulation-is-misguided-and-self-defeating/#6f074dbf3e54.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol41/iss3/2

2

Cerminara and Uzdavines: Introduction To Regulating Innovation In Healthcare: Protecting T

2017] INTRODUCTION TO REGULATING INNOVATION IN HEALTHCARE

307

The authors in this symposium issue presented their ideas at Nova
Southeastern University’s Shepard Broad College of Law in the autumn of
2016, marking the 50th anniversary of Henry K. Beecher’s “bombshell” of an
article in The New England Journal of Medicine with the unassuming title
Ethics and Clinical Research.7 In that article, Beecher documented 22
examples of “unethical or questionably ethical [medical research] studies.”8
At the time Beecher wrote the piece, only 21 years after the Nuremberg
trials,9 it was tempting to conclude that only Nazi physicians—not
Americans—required regulation to guard against unethical behavior in
medical research. Beecher’s findings, in many readers’ eyes, revealed
otherwise. He himself, while not wishing to point a finger at particular
researchers, explained:
Evidence is at hand that many of the patients in the examples to
follow never had the risk [of research protocols] satisfactorily
explained to them, and it seems obvious that further hundreds have
not known that they were the subjects of an experience although
grave consequences have been suffered as a direct result of
experiences described here. There is a belief prevalent in some
sophisticated circles that attention to these matters would “block
progress.” But, according to Pope Pius XII, “. . . science is not the
highest value to which all other orders of values . . . should be
10
subordinated.”

Beecher himself did not favor regulation. To him, the solution to the
problem presented by unethical conduct of medical research rested primarily
not on informed consent—the requirement of which is a form of regulation—
but on a “more reliable safeguard provided by the presence of an intelligent,
informed, conscientious, compassionate, responsible investigator.”11 After
all, in medicine, the opposite of regulation is not purely the free market, as it
is in the steel industry. Rather, the opposite of regulation in medicine is the
free market guided by professionalism and ethics of a sort that does not
dominate in the steel industry—or any other heavy industry for that matter.12
7.
See generally Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 N.
ENG. J. MED. 367 (1966); see also David S. Jones et al., “Ethics and Clinical Research” the
50th Anniversary of Beecher’s Bombshell, 374 N. ENG. J. MED. 2393 (2016).
8.
Beecher, supra note 7, at 368.
9.
See Jones at 2293–2294 (describing the Nuremberg Code’s appearance
after World War II and noting that “[n]any U.S. scientists believed that the Code . . . did not
apply to them”).
10.
Beecher, supra note 7, at 367 (footnote omitted).
11.
Id. at 372.
12.
See PETER J. HAMMER ET AL., UNCERTAIN TIMES: KENNETH ARROW AND
THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF HEALTHCARE 1–36 (2003) (reprinting Kenneth J. Arrow,
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As bioethicist Robert Veatch writes, Beecher did not believe the researchers
conducting the studies he described were consciously pursuing their selfinterest and ignoring their ethical obligations. Rather, “for Beecher, the
problem [was] well-meaning but thoughtless investigators who fail[ed] to
grasp what they [were] doing,” and “consciousness-raising” was the
solution.13
In contrast, Beecher’s former student, physician and bioethicist Jay
Katz, operated under the conviction “that well-designed legal procedures
could regulate (though not totally supplant) professional standards, which
[Katz] found insufficient in themselves as a check on unethical practices.”14
As Veatch explains, “[b]y 1973, it was becoming more and more obvious
that professional self-regulation was inadequate” in medical research.15 A
whistleblower had revealed details of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, through
which the United States Public Health Service, under the guise of treatment,
had studied untreated syphilis among poor, African-American men in
Macon, Georgia, for the past forty years.16 In hearings thereafter, which led
eventually to creation of the institutional review board (IRB) system of
governmental regulation of research, Beecher testified that he favored “a
massive professional education effort” instead.17 Nevertheless, as bioethicist
Alexander Morgan Capron notes, “there is no question that [both] Beecher
and Katz played pivotal roles in closing the post Nuremberg [ethical] lacuna
that had become glaringly apparent by 1972.”18 Although Beecher favored
reliance on ethics to govern the “free market” of medical research and Katz
believed in research regulation, the development of such regulation in the
United States stemmed at least partially from Katz’s “admiration for
[Beecher’s] courage—Beecher’s willingness to risk his privileged position
by lifting the veil that shielded the activities of his biomedical peers from
public view.”19 For that reason, even research regulation advocates admire

Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963) and
thereafter addressing the economics of modern healthcare issues).
13.
Robert M. Veatch, Henry Beecher’s Contributions to the Ethics of
Clinical Research, 59 PERSPS. IN BIOL. & MED. 3, 9 (2016).
14.
Alexander Morgan Capron, Henry Knowles Beecher, Jay Katz, and the
Transformation of Research With Human Beings, 59 PERSPS. IN BIOL. & MED. 55, 67 (2016).
15.
Veatch, supra note 13, at 15.
16.
Capron, supra note 14, at 68. See also JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE
STORY OF THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY (rev. ed. 1993) (for more about the Tuskegee
Syphilis Study).
17.
Veatch, supra note 13, at 16 (quoting Beecher as saying, “I think it is a
little too soon for this to be frozen into law.”).
18.
Capron, supra note 14, at 75.
19.
Id.
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and honor Beecher to this day, and it seemed fitting to hold a symposium in
his honor on the 50th anniversary of the article by which most know him.
III.

HEALTHCARE REGULATION BEYOND MEDICAL RESEARCH

The topics of innovation and the role that its regulation plays raise
questions in many areas of healthcare, not just clinical research. This
symposium addresses important aspects of healthcare innovation dealing
with delivery, payment, data collection, and technology. In organizing the
symposium at NSU, we brought together experts from across the country in
academia, government, and private practice to address the challenges in the
transformation of healthcare. The result was an explicitly interprofessional
event, during which the legal, medical, public health, and patient
communities learned from each other. These articles provide insight on both
sides of the question of whether regulating innovation is helping or hurting
the future of healthcare.
Jackson Williams, the Director of Government Affairs for Dialysis
Patient Citizens, addresses the need for innovation in healthcare business
models. He argues that a business model change could be a solution to the
current problem of high costs and low quality of healthcare in the United
States. Specifically, Williams “argues that insurance regulators [could]
catalyze cost containment efforts by encouraging, or mandating, insurers to
act vigorously as agents of consumers in obtaining low prices from
providers.”20 He also notes that insurance regulators could police provider
misconduct in healthcare markets, providing extra protection for patients.21
Williams discusses how an insurance commissioner’s regulatory authority
could solve the collective action problem by apportioning costs and thereby
incentivizing provider cooperation.22 Williams’ innovative proposal could
alleviate the skyrocketing cost-sharing obligations that currently exist in the
majority of employer-sponsored health insurance plans.
Another equally important area of innovation is digital health
information technology. As the healthcare industry has shifted from paper to
digital, new legal issues have arisen with how to keep patients and their
privacy interests protected. Cason Schmit, Research Assistant Professor of
Public Health at Texas A&M University, introduces a research project
undertaken by the Centers for Disease Control to examine the regulatory
framework of state statutes dealing with health information technology. The
20.
Jackson Williams, The Persistence of Opportunistic Business Models in
Healthcare and a Stronger Role for Insurance Regulators in Containing Healthcare Costs, 41
NOVA L. REV. 313, 314 (2017).
21.
Id.
22.
Id.
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research reveals that there are literally thousands of state laws addressing
digital health information in healthcare. Schmit notes that as technology has
continued to outpace legislation at an exponential rate, the states have
stepped up to create a patchwork of laws to try and keep up. Schmit argues
that this complicated patchwork of state laws could be impeding
advancements in health information technology because it is difficult to
discern the applicable laws, and, therefore, businesses that want to avoid
exposure to liability may steer clear of innovation for this reason. Schmit
notes, however, that some laws are helpful in enabling entities to engage in
new and innovative health information technology. In these instances,
instead of regulation becoming a barrier to innovation, the regulations
actually encourage and enable innovation. Schmit highlights how the law
has been both a benefit and a burden to innovation in healthcare.
While there are numerous benefits to be gained from the shift from
paper to digital, there are also new vulnerabilities associated with the data
that did not exist before this transition. This cycle of innovation and legal
catch-up is not uncommon in the law. Since its inception, the organization
now known as the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) has been charged
with protecting a vulnerable public from the manufacturers and sellers of
medical products. Initially, its purview was over products characterized as
drugs, but as medical devices became more sophisticated, and consequently
more dangerous, the FDA’s scope expanded to cover them as well.23 Despite
its best efforts, however, the FDA and the regulations that govern it have
always lagged behind the pace of technological advances, resulting in a cycle
of inaction, tragedy, and reaction.24
Innovation in health information technology mirrors the last century
of innovation in medical devices in that they both outpace the advancements
in law. They both also carry with them risks to a vulnerable public in
different ways. As advancements in health information technology bring
benefits to healthcare, they bring the potential for damage – not only physical
injury, as with medical devices, but also damage to financial and privacy
interests. Paul R. DeMuro, Associate Professor of Pharmacy at NSU,
examines the cybersecurity risks inherent in health information technology.
Specifically, DeMuro’s article discusses ransomware, a virus cybercriminals
use to bring patient care to a halt while they hold patients’ health information
captive. Ransomware has the potential to destroy privacy and prevent
appropriate care from being delivered to patients because computer systems

23.
1 JAMES T. O’REILLY & KATHERINE A. VAN TASSEL, FOOD
ADMINISTRATION § 12:9 (4th ed. 2016).
24.
See id. at § 12:7.
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are frozen until the ransom is paid to the cybercriminal.25 As innovation
creates new technology, existing security measures and regulations have
proven insufficient to protect against the vulnerabilities. DeMuro analyzes
the existing legal framework governing digital health information in the
healthcare industry and argues that negotiation theory should be applied to
the ransomware context to shed light on whether healthcare organizations
should be permitted to engage in ransom negotiations with cybercriminals.
As discussed above, this same tension between innovation and
regulation arises with the societal desire for advancement in medical devices.
Whether it is an improved implantable cardioverter defibrillator or an insulin
pump, most would agree that innovation in medical devices benefits the
public. However, as technology has increased with medical devices, so has
the ability to capture sensitive patient information through vulnerabilities in
the hardware or software. As Chris Kersbergen, Assistant Professor at
Keiser University, discusses in his article, it is easy hack into such devices.26
Kersbergen examines a recent draft FDA guidance on cybersecurity for
manufacturers of wirelessly connected, implanted medical devices.27 He
discusses why it is so easy to hack into such devices and critiques three
aspects of the draft guidance, suggesting that the FDA should include patient
privacy within the concept of patient safety when regulating in this area.28
Kersbergen argues for additional FDA regulation that focuses heavily on the
financial and other “identity” implications of hacking into medical devices as
a way to obtain patient data.29
Not only is there a risk that patient health information can be
exploited for financial gain, but the patient’s physical safety also could be
jeopardized by these various vulnerabilities. Michael Woods’s article
focuses on the physical safety aspect of cybersecurity of the same devices.
Woods is not as concerned about financial identity theft or patient data; he is
mainly concerned about patient physical safety and about terrorists who
could hack into medical devices to physically hurt patients. He does not
focus on any one agency or any one regulation or guidance document; part of
his point is that too many agencies are responsible for monitoring

25.
Paul R. DeMuro, Keeping Internet Pirates at Bay: Ransomware
Negotiation in the Healthcare Industry, 41 NOVA L. REV. 349, 352–53 (2017).
26.
Christopher Kersbergen, Patient Safety Should Include Patient Privacy:
The Shortcomings of the FDA’s Recent Draft Guidance Regarding Cybersecurity of Medical
Devices, 41 NOVA. L. REV. 397, 397 (2017).
27.
Id. at 417–18.
28.
Id. at 412–14.
29.
Id. at 401.
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cybersecurity of such devices, in various ways.30 Similar to Schmit’s
highlighting of the complicated patchwork of regulations, Woods seeks
clarification among the various government agencies regulating in this area.
This is an area characterized by duplication of laws and overlap of authority,
creating problems in effective enforcement of the law. When the potential
for serious harm is so high, Woods argues, there should be a unified
approach to regulation among agencies.31 Without a unified, proactive
approach to these regulations, the United States could be facing another
cycle of inaction, tragedy, and reaction.
The transformation of healthcare is certain. If and how regulation
will respond to this transformation will have a profound personal impact on
us all. This symposium explores the highly political question of how much
involvement the law should have in the innovation of healthcare. We hope it
adds to the discourse and exposes areas where changes in the law can help
shape the healthcare industry.

30.
Michael Woods, Cardiac Defribrillators Need to Have a Bulletproof Vest:
The National Security Risk Posed by the Lack of Cybersecurity in Implantable Medical
Devices, 41 NOVA. L. REV. 419, 437–39 (2017).
31.
Id. at 440–42.
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